View Audit

New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr. released an audit today that detailed several problems with the Police Department's (NYPD) Domestic Violence Tracking System (DVTS), an online, Internet-accessed database system that is designed to assist NYPD officers in fighting domestic violence.

DVTS was designed to allow each precinct to view the domestic violence cases of all other precincts as well as link to other agencies. The system was built at a cost of $1.17 million by Information Builders Inc. (IBI), but fulfilled only 9 of its 18 requirements because of inadequate quality assurance on NYPD's part. Seven of these nine unfilled requirements involve linking NYPD and the Department of Probation (DOP), and accessing, modifying and extracting data from the system.

"New York's Finest need the best technology to combat domestic violence," said Comptroller Thompson. "The City's fight against domestic abuse and violence must remain one of our top priorities. The NYPD paid for a system that simply does not meet all of its needs."

The Comptroller's audit also revealed that many of the surveyed DVTS users are unhappy with the system. Approximately 80 percent wanted to see the system improved. Fifty-three percent reported that accessing DVTS often results in work delays. Seventy-three percent stated that the system is occasionally inaccurate and contains duplicate reports. Forty-seven percent simply didn't find the system user-friendly.

The audit generated six recommendations, which suggest that the NYPD should:

· Ensure that IBI completes and meets all requirements according to contract terms.

· Obtain a quality assurance individual to review future system changes and enhancements.

· Meet with system users to ensure that the problems identified in this report are resolved.

· Develop formal security policies and procedures for DVTS that comply with the Comptroller's Internal Control and Accountability Directive 18: Guidelines for the Management, Protection and Control of Agency Information and Information Processing Systems.

· Eliminate inactive users, as required in Directive 18. The NYPD has not developed formal security procedures for DVTS. Inactive users of DVTS (users who have not logged on in over 180 days) are not being deleted from the system, creating a security risk that exposes DVTS to misuse.

· Develop a formal Disaster Recovery Plan for DVTS and ensure that it is tested in accordance with Directive 18.

The NYPD agreed with the audit's recommendations, stating that it has already been addressing four of the Comptroller's six recommendations before the audit began and that it would implement the two remaining recommendations.

###